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The external relations of the monarchy in Thai politics1 
 
Tentative draft – only for discussion 
 
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2 
 
The real political problem in Siam was – and is - precisely this: that there was no 
decisive popular break with ’absolutism’, fuelled by social radicalism and mass 
nationalism 
(Anderson 1978: 225) 
 
The September 19 military coup in Thailand in 2006 caught most observers by 
surprise. A great majority of media, laymen, politicians and not least the academic 
community had more or less denied the possibility of a return of the military into 
Thai politics. Only very few saw the army’s withdrawal to the barracks as a 
temporary matter and few would have predicted that the monarchy would become 
directly involved in the matter. 
 
A number of scholars see the Thai monarchy and King Bhumipol as the preserver and 
vanguard of conservative and nationalist values (Hewison 1997) It has been said 
again and again that the King himself is the last bastion of Thainess. Key to his 
achievement has been the power of traditional symbolism, the dynamics of the Cold 
War, the evolution of Bhumipol’s own thought, the little known world of the king’s 
spirituality, and the palace’s even less known capitalism (Handley 2006: 10). 
 
Any critique of the Royal House has been dismissed and banned – from movies, to 
international magazines, books and bibliographies, and even internet websites. The 
socalled mandates or ‘royal prescriptions’ phraratchaniyom have promulgated “what 
would constitute treasonous activity, for example revealing information to foreigners 
that might be damaging to the nation or acting against the national interest as agents 
of spokesmen for foreign governments” (Reynolds 1991: 5-6).This edict from 1939, 
later translated into legislation, articulated the belief in the ruling elite and the 
popular masses, “that certain political groups or political activity – most notably 
communist – was ‘un-Thai’ or even ‘anti-Thai’ and thus dangerous, subversive, and 
destabilizing” (Reynolds 1991: 6).  This has happened with the silent accept of the 
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international community and even the support from some quarters in the domestic 
arena. 
 
The supporters of censorship claim that, without the monarchy, Thailand will be 
destroyed. What is interesting in the context of the recent military coup is the fact that 
the King gave his blessing to the military coup d’Etat and the question which this 
paper tries to answer is why the international community accepted the destruction of 
democracy and what is the ideological relationship between the Royal House and its 
external partners? The question is whether the old Thailand, where small royal, 
aristocratic or military elites could dominate a quiescent population of subsistence 
farmers, has gone? 
 
One dimension of the coup which so far has not been explored is the role of the King 
and the international reactions before and after the coup. A more thorough 
explanation of the political orientation and connections of the monarchy with the 
most important external actors – not only in the near abroad in Southeast Asia but 
more importantly as this paper tentatively intends to investigate: What are the values, 
the ideology, and the geo-political and geo-economic influences and relationship 
between the monarchy in Thailand and the United States and China? 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first part discusses the most important 
explanations of the coup. The second part is devoted to history and ideology of the 
king and the throne while the third develops an image of the Crown Property Bureau 
and the Privy council’s role in Thai politics. The fourth and fifth sections look more 
squarely at the impact of the rivalry of the US and China and the regional security 
dimension in relation to the coup itself and more specifically the role of the king. 
Finally some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
The coup and its explanations 
There are a variety of suggestions trying to explain why the Thai military decided to 
stage the 18th coup in 75 years. Some point to corruption and declining growth and 
investment rates and others to the underlying structural causes of transformation and 
maldevelopment. The high economic growth rates before the 1997 crash produced 
extreme disparities of wealth, both vertically and horizontally. The affluent share the 
cities with workers on minimal wages, frequently labouring in atrocious conditions. 
When income is expressed in per capita terms, however, urban Thais are vastly better 
off than those in rural areas. Poverty is particularly pronounced in the north, northeast 
and far south. Most industrial development has focussed on Bangkok, which now 
accounts for over 50 per cent of the nation’s GDP although it has only an estimated 
15 per cent of the population. This imbalance and uneven development explain 
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Thaksin’s popularity as promoter of social change and in contrast the King’s role as 
national symbol and promoter social order.  
 
Still others refer to the security problems in the Southern-most provinces of Thailand. 
Immediately after seizing power and pledging a new, conciliatory strategy to tackle 
violence in the Muslim-dominated south, Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, 
right, and his Malaysian counterpart Abdullah Badawi met in Kuala Lumpur and in 
an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review a few hours before the coup took 
place Prem Tinsulanonda gave strong indications that the security situation in the 
South had certain resemblances with the ‘communist terrorists’ in Northeast Thailand 
in the 1970s (Murphy 2006). In a statement General Surayud Chulanont explicitly 
said that “During the time of the Thaksin government, the southern problem was 
mishandled by him, [he] took a hard-line stance against the insurgents," “People were 
abducted and killed, causing more anger and hardship against government officials" 
(Wolff and Kate 2006).  
 
A third explanation has tried to relate the coup to the role of the Privy council and 
King Bhumipol Adulyadej and not least the unresolved question about succession 
which essentially can be viewed in the context of power politics (Handley 2006b). 
The king turned 80 in December 2006 and is in ill health. This raises the question 
who is going to become the next king and subsequently who is going to preside over 
the informal and indeed formal institutional influence of the monarchy on the future 
of Thai politics and economics (Ockey 2005)?  As Bowring notes “After 60 years on 
the throne, King Bhumibol Adulyadej's prestige has never been higher, nor his 
political influence greater (the palace overtly supported the recent coup makers). Yet 
the Thai monarchy has come close to extinction before, whether at the hands of 
democrats or generals, so Bhumipol's successor, whoever that may be, will need to 
understand that a monarch's political power in a modern state is more” (Bowring 
2006a). 
 
Most Thai specialists thought that the country's 1997 constitutional democracy and 
the strength of representatives of private capital in politics inevitably would prevent 
another military intervention. The reality shows that confrontations between the 
Prime Minister and palace became more and more prominent not least because of the 
attempts by Thaksin to remove high-ranking bureaucrats close to the King. In effect 
Thaksin’s moves diminished the monarch's influence inside the bureaucracy and 
seemingly “tried to consolidate his power in anticipation of the post-Bhumibol era. 
For example, when Thaksin ordered in 2001 the sidelining of Kasem Watanachai and 
Palakorn Suwannarat, two well-known royalist bureaucratic officials, the King within 
hours appointed both of them to his 19-member Privy council” (Kavi 2007a). For 
months, Thaksin had rivalries with the king and blamed an unnamed ‘charismatic 
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figure’ for his troubles. This even went so far that after the King was hospitalized 
Thaksin offered him a free health insurance-card to the 30-baht health scheme 
perhaps as a provocation but more likely in order to demystify the charismatic aura of 
the King in the eyes of the people. 
 
Another case involved the military reshuffle where Thaksin tried to promote faction 
from the pre-Cadet Class 10 loyalists to the pivotal 1st Army Division. That incident 
brought Thaksin into conflict with senior members of the army and the Privy council, 
and his refusal to back down from the proposed personnel changes appears to have 
been a major factor behind the coup. Thaksin attempted to “elevate Major-General 
Prin Suwanthat to commander of the 1st Army Division, which crucially is charged 
with overseeing security in Bangkok. Thaksin also reportedly pushed to promote 
Prin's ally, Major-General Daopong Ratanasuwan, to take over the 1st Infantry. With 
assistant army commander Pornchai Kranlert in place, the reshuffle, if accomplished, 
would have given Thaksin an unbroken chain of command over crack troops 
responsible for Bangkok's security” (Kavi 2007a). These attempts to attain the upper 
hand on the state’s monopoly of the means of violence showed that the military is not 
a monolithic entity but rather composed of opposing factions – some pro palace and 
others more inclined towards constitutional based democracy and still others with 
different opinions. 
The continued provocations from the TDR and Thaksin himself led to accusations 
and rumours about the so-called ‘Finland Plan,’ in which it alleged that the Prime 
Minister was part of a conspiracy to overthrow the king. This began a series of 
accusations and counter-accusations. Pairoj Vongvipanon for instance said that 
“Thaksin must be careful or else he might be killed. Don't think that assassinations 
cannot occur in Thailand” (Wolfe 2006). 
The coup itself was essentially a retro action. A military coup, not seen in Thailand in 
15 years. Indeed, the sight of army troops in Bangkok was surprising to most Thai 
and international other observers while few others have noted that General Saprang 
who in Bangkok Post admitted that the idea had been around for seven or eight 
months (http://www.bangkokpost.com/Outlook/05Mar2007_out49.php). As the 
national and international audience saw the events unfold on TV and on the ground 
the armed soldiers displayed yellow ribbons as a symbol and endorsement to King 
Bhumipol and the coup leaders announced the new name of the junta: Council for 
Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (the 1991 coup makers called 
themselves The National Peace-Keeping Council).  
 
The King’s direct political role and legitimating of the coup led one academic “to call 
the event ‘a royalist coup’.” In addition, during the night of the coup, all radio 
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stations and television channels played songs composed by the King, interspersed 
with pictures of the King’s activities in development projects initiated by the royal 
family. This display has led another academic to shrewdly call it the ‘unread 
announcements’ of the coup leaders” (Chairat 2007). Another indication which shows 
that the coup had been planned many months before was the wish of the junta to 
install Pridiyathorn Devakula as the new central bank governor. On returning to 
Thailand from New York the day after coup he said “hadn’t thought about it”, but 
there is speculation whether “he is being economic with the truth, and that he in fact 
was instrumental in organizing the takeover. Conspiracy theorists have even 
suggested that the central bank governor had been talking up the baht in recent weeks 
to prop-up the currency and offset any damage done by the coup” 
(www.asia.int.com/arl/arl11465.asp). 
One of the early students of Thai politics Fred Riggs who in his book on Thailand 
from 1966: ‘The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity’ argued that Thai 
bureaucrats, whether civilian or in military outfit, are noted for their involvement in 
politics. The bureaucratic participation, as Riggs called it, has historically speaking 
been part and parcel in the Thai political arena all the way back to the overthrow of 
absolute monarchy in 1932 which according to Riggs was an uprising of the 
bureaucrats for the bureaucracy. In fact, we also see a certain inertia in the 
announcements from the military leaders – the four reasons mentioned by General 
Sonthi clearly echoes the reasons for the coup in 1976 and also in 1991 where 
General Suchinda mounted a coup against the civilian government on the same 
claims of widespread corruption and the existence of ‘unusually rich’ politicians and 
again the usual accusations of lèse majesté against the King. What is interesting in 
this respect is that this time it might be more plausible to see the intervention by the 
Privy council and the army factions loyal to the King as part of an inter-factional 
capitalist confrontation between opposing capital interests (Ukrist 2007). A point I 
will come back to below. 
With one exception, the coup in 1976, the main difference between the other 18 
coups since 1932 and the military takeover in 2006 was that this time King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej not only endorsed the coup, but also through his Privy council and army 
proxies, the king took absolute control of the whole kingdom. The Privy council 
today “as a body can institutionalise not only the formal role of the monarcy but to 
some degree, as we saw with Prem, it can take on the informal constitutional role of 
the monarch as well (Ockey 2005: 123). 
Does it mean that Rigg’s thesis is correct today as well? Yes and no with certain 
modifications there is some truth in it as “Thailand's civil servants literally serve the 
king” (Vatikiotis 2006) and it was a predictable outcome of Thaksin’s threats against 
the power circles of King Bhumipol’s old boy’s monarchy network (McCargo 2005) 
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or simply the conservative elite. Bhumibol had over the years maintained his 
authority over elected politicians through so-called ‘monarchic networks’ of loyal 
royalists strategically positioned inside the bureaucracy, including the highest 
echelons of the military. But the coup is also a reminder to those scholars who 
repeatedly have claimed that the bureaucratic polity was over and had been replaced 
by a different model in response to the bargaining strategies employed by big and 
local business associations and representatives of big capital. What it really implies is 
furthermore and again that when the King he dies a power struggle will inevitably 
occur about the future direction of Thai society. 
 
In a review of Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles, a banned book in Thailand, the 
author stress that the “King remains the ultimate arbiter of power” and citizens expect 
“that in a crisis it is the King, and not his government, who comes to the people’s 
rescue” (Buruma 2007). This observation might lead to the conclusion that because 
Thaksin actually became a threat to the real power of the King he would sooner or 
later run into trouble especially since he tried to replace those loyal to King Bhumipol 
in bureaucracy and the military with his own people. But it was the King’s network – 
their ideology and political sympathies which determined the situation and this is 
where the US-China link comes in. The question is whether the geopolitical role and 
ideological influence of the US and China had a significant impact as well on both 
King Bhumipol and the Privy council’s support both before and after the coup. In 
fact, some evidence shows that if not directly then indirectly the White House gave a 
green light to stage the coup. In the end the new military dictatorship has probably 
strengthened the position of the United States in both Thailand and Southeast Asia as 
a whole. 
 
The power and influence Bhumipol exercises can be interpreted through a dual 
perspective on the informal and formal institutions of the palace. The throne would 
not be able to act as patronage of Thai national identity and preserver of social order 
without real financial and ideological clout. It is not only the symbolic or informal 
power which is important to understand but also the real institutions of the monarchy 
(Ockey 2005: 117). 
 
The historical dimension – the ideology of the throne 
King Bhumipol has always had historical close ties with the United States. Born and 
raised in the US and later on educated in Switzerland his political awareness was 
sharpened during the Cold War (Handley 2006a: 187-189). It is probably not wrong 
to suggest that the anti-communism of the old conservative generation of the Privy 
council and the king himself has strong influence on their thinking today and that 
Cold War support from the United States has been a keystone of Thai security 
(Chairat 1985; Surachart 1988). As various observers have argued the monarch 
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values stability over democracy and has been traditionally conservative in his 
ideological orientation. The construction of the ideology of the throne can be 
intercepted as an active political force working towards a ‘conservative capitalist 
state’ (Hewison 1997).  
 
This is a state where the monarchy ideologically disciplines the rural population 
through the discourse of thrift, self-reliance, national security and moral selfhood. 
Because of the fragmentation and competition in and between the state and the 
bourgeoisie the monarchy remains a key force for integration. “This dual position, as 
an agent of political and economic interests, and as a symbol transfigured as the soul 
and destiny of the nation, requires an iron regime of controlled imagery, given the 
glaring disparity between the rich and the poor” (Connors 2003: 132-133).  It may be 
argued that the shared societal discourse of redistribution, social welfare and social 
rights is a direct outcome of the ideology of conservatism and philanthropy. This type 
of thinking is articulated in discourses of ‘sufficiency economy’ which in reality is a 
replacement of a social economy and a general belief that civil society can replace the 
role of the state as provider of collective goods. This particular ideology is used to 
discipline labour’s demands for social security and, in general, demands that could 
humanize and socialize work and living conditions and economic relations (Schmidt 
2002: 103). 
 
It is also rather striking that Washington historically and currently has regarded the 
king, and not the Prime Minister, as head of state. This has been the indirect excuse 
for US recognition of governments in Thailand that came to power by military force, 
while the monarchy over time came to engage itself deeply in the Thai political, 
economic, and social structure. The accusations against the Privy council and 
especially former Prime Minister and current Chief Privy councillor Prem 
Tinsulanonda of masterminding military alliances, their control of the Crown 
Property Bureau with its vast empire of land holdings and companies, and co-optation 
of the Buddhist sangha, have all led to unclear boundaries between the informal 
extra-constitutional power of the monarchy and the real institutions belonging to the 
King. The support from the United States during and after the Vietnam War has led 
to the construction of a vast and complex network of modern royalist political, 
economic and security interests which are entrenched into the national economy. The 
alliance between the conservative elite, and important factions within the military and 
the formal and informal power structure of the monarchy has required a coordinated 
formula “to rationalise military rule while attempting to give it somewhat of a 
popular face, US and Thai elites consciously promoted reassertion of the monarchy” 
(Glassman 2007: 2040).  
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This was a process which first culminated with the historic ‘break’ of the popular 
movement of 1973, on 14 October, with the collapse of the Thanom-Praphat regime 
(Anderson 1990:40). The ideological restoration started with the bloody coup of 
October 6, 1976 which implicated all of the major rightwing forces (the palace and 
king, CIA, Village Scouts, right-wing neo-fascist elements in the military and 
Supreme Command). The unusual level of brutality and violence (for which no-one 
has so far been made accountable) was an effort to eradicate and discredit all the 
groups who would resist the existing order. In the aftermath came the reinforcement 
of the lese majestè laws and it became clear that the royal family had been closely 
involved in the incidents or even orchestrated the process that led to the return of 
military rule and the bloody massacre at Thammasat University in October 1976. In 
this way the formal intervention by king Bhumipol shows in a contradictory way that, 
“….. ‘Royalism’ in the sense of an active quest for real power in the political system 
by the royal family – i.e. the role of a political ‘subject’ – persists in a curiously 
antique form in contemporary Siam….This is all the odder since the present ruler’s 
accession to the throne was a product purely of formal lineage and accident and 
should therefore have made him an ideal political subject.” (Anderson 1977 cf 
Handley 2006a: 428). Handley offers compelling arguments that Bhumipol 
persistently favours weak governments of doubtful competence, inept and usually 
short-lived regimes that leave his own influence and mystique unchallenged 
(McCargo 2007: 140). 
It is also of interest to note that Prem himself has strong Cold War ties to several 
leading neo-conservative hawks from the Republican Party such as Paul Wolfowitz 
who he thanked in the US in 2000 for his role in assisting Thailand after Vietnamese 
communist troops invaded neighbouring Cambodia in 1979 and threatened to 
continue their march into Thailand (Crispin 2007). The pro-US Prem has furthermore 
a strong influence in the military and has for decades dominated promotions and 
reshuffles with the result that civil-military relations are very unstable and 
problematic (Ockey 2005). In the end it is also clear that Prem in the weeks leading to 
the coup met with top brass from the army in full military uniform and repeated that 
soldiers should be loyal to the King and not the government. 
The Crown Property Bureau (CPB) clash with Shin Corp  
It remains a puzzle whether there is a connection between the coup against Thaksin 
and the result of the financial crisis in 1997 where the King’s private wealth which 
was estimated to be US$ 1.8 billion. In 1998 it appeared to have evaporated as he had 
been bumped of the Forbes magazine list, “presumably on account of the effects of 
Asia’s economic crisis.” (Backman 1999: 249). CPB is owned by the king and the 
immediate members of the family hold shares in several Thai listed companies. CPB 
ensures that the Thai royal family remains financially independent of the state. “It 
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also helped keep the family’s assets out of reach of Thai politicians and the military.” 
(Backman 1999: 249). CPB controls Siam Cement – an emerging industrial 
conglomerate cum multinational with 69 subsidiaries and 37 associated companies 
and Dhana Siam Finance; and Securities PLC; and Thai Insurance PLC; Siam 
Commercial Bank Pcl (SCB); Thailand’s third-biggest lender, which is 21 percent 
owned by the king. A third royal-controlled company, Deves Insurance Pcl is 87 
percent owned by CPB.  
The financial crash on July 2, 1997 saw the baht plunge to 55 to the U.S. dollar from 
a rate of 25 to the dollar six months earlier. Half of the loans held by Thai banks 
defaulted. Hundreds of companies collapsed. The king’s companies didn’t escape. 
Siam Cement’s debt totaled $6 billion, $4.5 billion of it in dollars. It had foreign 
exchange losses of $1.5 billion, but Chirayu, the board chairman said in 1998 that it 
would cut 143 billion baht worth of projects and adopt the king’s ‘sufficiency 
economy’ approach (Asia Sentinel 2007). 
Nonperforming loans at the king’s bank, SCB, rose to 40 percent. The CPB saw its 
income plunge by a reported 75%, and it was forced to borrow about $200 million 
from its bankers to support the royal household. (Ellis 2003). SCB was the first 
lender to accept a government offer to inject 32.5 billion baht in capital in exchange 
for equity. In the process, CPB’s shareholdings in the bank were reduced by half. In 
2005, CPB increased its stake by swapping 181 acres of property for SCB shares 
(Oxford Analytica 09.20.06). 
Today King Bhumibol Adulyadej with an official fortune of $5 billion is the fifth 
richest among the royals in the world (Pendleton et al. 2007), but as Bachman notes 
“Crisis or no crisis, the king’s private wealth seems to have been wildly under-
estimated. Real estate investments and massive holdings of Thai blue-chip stocks 
have underwritten much of the Thai royal family’s private riches. The true figure of 
the family’s personal wealth is likely to be closer to US$ 8 billion (split roughly 
between Thai blue chips and Bangkok real estate …. [1999 figures J.D.S.]) (Backman 
1999: 249).  
Thailand's royals live of the income of the CPB, created in 1936 as the absolute 
monarchy evolved into a constitutional one. The deal, which gave the bureau about 
half of downtown Bangkok and vast tracts elsewhere in the country, ensured that the 
royals would be supported in style without burdening the state. The CPB, and hence 
the king, is the single biggest landlord in Thailand. They own enormous holdings in 
most of the provinces ... “ and as much as one quarter of all Bangkok’s central 
business land is in the hands of the bureau..... the bureau is sitting on a land bank in 
the middle of Bangkok of some 2.5 million square meters” (Backman 1999: 251). A 
further income of the monarchy comes from donations and the budget allocation from 
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the government which “makes the majority of the income of the monarchy dependent 
on the success of the economy in general and of its specific investments in particular” 
(Ockey 2005: 119). It is furthermore important to note that the majority of the income 
generated is spend on benevolent royal development and other types of projects 
which enhance national identity, but these projects are also a mean to influence and 
enhance the prestige of the monarchy. Handley argues that the royal projects, along 
with low rents, before the crisis, and media campaigns, were an orchestrated effort by 
the palace to win political support for the throne. This could be seen from the many 
villagers who petitioned the king directly to help them (Handley 2006a). 
Although the CPB is Thailand's biggest landlord, with 35,000 leases on its books 
many tenants stayed put before the crisis in 1997 after their leases expired. Others 
traded CPB plots without approval, fuelling speculation. And rents hadn't been raised 
for decades. Thailand's police headquarters sits on a prime Bangkok lot, for which it 
pays about 1,000 baht ($23) a year. After the financial crisis, CPB raised the rents on 
properties to levels approaching market value. The CPB's new policy of instituting 
progressively higher rents across the board has made it unpopular in some quarters, 
but the agency was out of debt and due to the increase generating about $50 million a 
year in income (Oxford Analytica 09.20.06).  
But for all its modernization, the CPB remains opaque, its finances known only to the 
king and a handful of advisors. "We cannot be viewed through a Western prism. We 
are transparent in our own way—to survive the judgment of the big boss, the king" 
(Ellis 2003). 
Foreign capital sees the CPB and in fact all the symbolism and charisma of the king 
and the throne as the cornerstone and indeed the precondition of economic growth 
and safe investment. As Judy Benn, executive director of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Thailand says, “the king has been a rock in Thai society” (Mellor 
2007). Investors, spooked by the military takeover and junta-appointed interim 
government, are wading into Thailand and looking for bargains. They’re betting that 
companies backed by a king who has survived on the throne for 61 years may be 
among the safest in Thailand, an agricultural and manufacturing country of 65 million 
that’s the world’s biggest exporter of rice and Southeast Asia’s largest auto assembly 
hub. After the military coup Chris Baker was quoted: “Bhumibol has re-established 
the monarchy against all the odds,” and “The Crown Property Bureau is quite simply 
the biggest corporate group in Thailand” (Oxford Analytica 09.20.06). 
Other big capital interests are also very rosy in the way they characterize the 
importance of the throne: “The crown is the one single unifying force in Thailand,” 
says Korn Chatikavanij, former chairman in Thailand of JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
who’s now deputy secretary-general of the Democrat Party, which was the main 
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opposition group when Thaksin was Prime Minister. And related to the question 
about sucession: “Every change means uncertainty, but the Thai people’s respect for 
the king transcends the person and reflects a deep, instinctive respect for the 
institution” (Mellor 2007).  
It seems quite evident that questions related to the role of foreign capital and rivalry 
between domestic capital interest played an important role in terms of the decision of 
the monarchy network and the king himself to launch the military coup. According to 
data compiled by Bloomberg, in total, the companies controlled by CPB account for 
more than 7.5 percent of the market capitalization of the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET). Before Thaksin and his family owned Shin Corporation sold their biggest 
holdings to Temasek a state-owned Singaporean company they accounted for as 
much as 10 percent of the SET.  
Thaksin had not only managed to become the richest man in the country but 
according to Handley and others he very well knew palace weaknesses and that 
already in 1997 he was aware of the fact that the throne depended on the government 
to save palace-controlled SCB after the crash (Handley 2006c). This was furthermore 
exacerbated by Thaksin’s strategic plan to outperform the king as the new 
charismatic symbol of salvation of the nation and his attempt to acclaim the same 
prestige and power as the monarch as an enlightened and benevolent leader. The sale 
of Shin Corporation became the last mistake of Thaksin and in fact it led to his 
demise. 
According to speculation in Thai newspapers it would be the irony of this story if the 
CPB buys Themasek not least seen in light of the fact that one of the accusations 
against Thaksin was that he sold national assets to a state-owned Singaporean 
company which is now ready to sell with a huge loss (Pethanet 2006). The same 
report mentioned that a handful of Thai companies such as Siam Cement, Charoen 
Pokphand (CP) and Thai Beverage Plc wanted to buy back the Shin Corp stake. It 
indicated that the accusations against Thaksin eventually both have a security and a 
real capital interest issue. The sale itself involved a who’s who as the Nation 
described it with the biggest political and business names in Thailand and Singapore. 
The US investment banking firm Goldman Sachs was the adviser of the deal and the 
CPB owned SCB was very much involved through the Director Peter Seah Lim Huat 
and Vichit Suraphongchai, the executive chairman of SCB. Siam Commercial Bank 
alone pocketed about Bt800 million for the advisory deal (Thanong 2006). 
Thaksin was accused of selling national assets to Singapore because Shin corporation 
through its affiliates, controls a mobile phone concession, a satellite concession, a TV 
concession (formerly owned by the king’s CPB) and aviation rights. To make matters 
worse he did not pay any tax (Thanong 2006). Most criticism of the deal, however, 
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centered on the complicated shareholding structure Temasek used to purchase Shin in 
such a way that it could bypass Thai law on foreign ownership restrictions. An 
anonymous correspondent at the Asia Sentinel said: “Despite these interlocking 
interests, public anger was directed solely at Thaksin for “selling off” a valuable Thai 
national asset to foreigners. SCB and CPB were barely mentioned in the local press, 
even though they actively helped Temasek allegedly violate the law” (Asia Sentinel 
2007). It also has to be taken into consideration that one of the important outcomes of 
the financial crisis brought a very significant change to the ownership structure of 
Thai commercial banks. Before they were monopolized by tycoon families and the 
CPB, but now they have been transferred to foreign shareholders, especially 
Singaporean financial institutions (Kitti 2006: 17). It means that foreign ownership in 
itself has become a contested issue not only in the context of the Thai political 
economy but even more as a sensitive security related issue involving popular 
sentiment and manipulation from a variety of interests. 
These deliberations show that ten years after the financial crash there are still 
important implications which involve regional players like Singapore and others as 
well. As a friend of Prem and affiliate with the monarchy network Anand 
Panyarachun wrote in the Nation a few weeks before the coup “the wellbeing of the 
people is tantamount to the well-being of the sovereign. The two are inseparable and 
inter-related.” He furthermore put stress on the concern of the king for the “security 
and stability of the Thai nation” (Anand 2006). This is not to underestimate the 
importance of Thaksin’s challenges to the king and CPB. Thaksin became a rival to 
the palace both in terms of popularity, as benevolent donor of private social welfare, 
and simply because he was the richest man in Thailand. Not only the monarchy 
network but intellectuals and union leaders as well (Kasian 2006) considered Thaksin 
as a more dangerous threat than the communist insurgency in the 1970s and a threat 
to the image of ‘sufficiency economics’ as well. Ukrist and McCargo’s reading of the 
situation stems very well with these observations that Prem’s privileged position in 
Thai society began to decline after Thaksin became Prime Minister. The monarchy 
network was threatened by the assertiveness of Thaksin’s new political economy 
network – ideologically, politically and economically (McCargo and Ukrist 2005:chp. 
6).  
The regional connection 
The coup has ramifications for political and social change in Southeast Asia as well. 
It is a severe setback for Indonesia which became democratic in the wake of the 
financial crisis in 1997. In particular there are parallels with the so-called soft 
military coup in the Philippines in 2001 where Joseph Estrada was replaced with 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Thailand had not experienced a coup in 15 years, and 
most observers thought that democracy and stability were inevitable. 
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Southeast Asia is furthermore considered by many Asia experts to be a key arena of 
soft power competition between Washington and Beijing. The loss of democratic 
government as any resulting friction with the United States could be considered an 
opening for closer Sino-Thai relations. On the other hand, Thaksin was an ardent 
supporter for establishing a closer economic and political relationship with China 
(Chanlett-Avery 2006:13) and also became involved in business with Myanmar’s 
military leaders. He was also a great admirer of Malaysia’s and Singapore’s one-party 
model and saw Mahathir and Lee Kwan Yew as great statesmen (Pasuk 2004). 
The country's institutions remain in an unresolved state of affairs, and the military 
continues to regard democracy with suspicion (McCargo and Ukrist 2005). The coup 
is also bad news for Thailand's neighbours, especially Myanmar. Thailand is one of 
the few countries with real influence over Myanmar's military junta.  But the Thai 
leaders will hardly exert pressure on Myanmar to introduce democracy as they both 
mutually see the coup as a justification for inaction and the coup lends greater 
legitimacy to authoritarian regimes. A good illustration came when munks and 
students went to the streets in Yangoon, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont wrote a 
letter to General Than Shwe expressing solidarity with him and stressing that he was 
speaking as one soldier to another. According to Kavi Chongkittavorn from the 
Nation It “was a shameful gesture from a leader who claims to be democratic. Such 
hypocrisy at the personal level has further hampered Thai diplomacy on Burma” 
(Kavi 2007). King Bhumipol has also on earlier occasions expressed his understand 
and even sympathy of the Burmese dictatorship. 
The United States, European Union, Japan, and Australia officially reacted with 
disappointment to the coup, and each called for a quick return to democracy. None, 
however, demanded that Thaksin's government be reinstated. China said it was an 
internal situation and that it would continue to push for closer relations with Thailand 
regardless of what form the government takes. 
What this implies is that there is an external geo-political and geo-economic 
dimension, regional as well as extra-regional, which has to be taken into 
consideration. 
Chinese influence 
Beijing brushed off Thailand's military coup as an internal affair and wished the 
country “harmony and prosperity". “It's Thailand's own internal affair. The PRC has 
consistently upheld the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal 
affairs," the foreign ministry said in a statement posted on its website. 
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Thai coup leader Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin visited Beijing in January 2007 for four 
days. The Communist People’s Daily reported. “The Chinese army would like to 
promote friendly relations with the Thai army,”China is now offering Thailand $40 
million in military aid. There are growing numbers of Thai military officers going to 
China for training. There are Chinese military officers coming to Thailand offering 
military education opportunities. The Chinese don’t use sanctions to punish non-
democratic countries. 
The Chinese also put more money on the table than the US had denied Thailand. 
China announced a special assistance package that included $49 million worth of 
military aid and training. Beijing continued with visits to Thailand by several senior 
Chinese officials, mostly in the military and security fields. State councilor Tang 
Jiaxuan, a former Chinese foreign minister visited Bangkok after the Chinese New 
Year. He reaffirmed Beijing’s support of the Council for National Security (CNS) 
although the Chinese leaders probably would have preferred Thaksin. 
US endorsement of the coup 
That reality hurts the United States far beyond Thailand, Pongsudhirak said to 
defencenew.com. “This is why the Americans are falling behind. Not just with 
Thailand but also with Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, even other ASEAN 
countries,” he said. “China has a lot to offer now. China is embracing ASEAN on a 
multitude of fronts, not just military, but political, strategic, economic, trade, 
investment and cultural. And the US has become constrained by all these legalistic, 
politically correct mechanisms. US foreign policy in Asia has been held hostage by 
US domestic politics, and sometimes American parochial pressure groups. Many 
special interest groups opposing a policy can kill it. China is not constrained on this 
front. At least this is the excuse nowadays while before communism used to the 
reason for US support to rightwing dictators.” 
 
More than one year after the coup little appears to be out of the ordinary for US-Thai 
military relations. Although US Ambassador Ralph Boyce was the first foreign 
diplomat who met with coup leader general Surayud tensions between Bangkok and 
Washington remain and Beijing may benefit. Despite US suspension of $24 million 
in military aid and cancellation of some military education programs various joint 
US-Thai military exercises appears to be business as usual. US law prohibits 
Washington from providing military assistance after an elected leader is deposed by a 
coup but Thailand's military is well connected to US security agencies. In fact, “the 
United States continues to rely primarily on bilateral security relationships in 
Southeast Asia” (Simon 2007) and in most cases secret and personalised relations. 
Although Washington did not condone the coup, those ties have prevented any 
serious  sanctions. The United States maintains a counter-terrorism training center 
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with Thai security forces; Thailand and the US conduct over 40 joint military 
exercises a year; including Cobra-Gold, America’s largest combined military exercise 
in Asia; 20.000 soldiers including many of those in top leadership positions have 
received US training under the International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET) which is  “designed to enhance the professionalism of foreign 
militaries as well as improve defence cooperation with the United States, the program 
is regarded by many as a relative low-cost, highly effective means to achieve US 
national ‘security goals’” (Chanlett-Avery 2006: 10). 
 
Thailand is one of five U.S. treaty allies in Asia and was designated a Major Non-
NATO Ally in 2003. Thailand has sent troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq and has 
aggressively pursued terrorist cells within its borders. In 2006, the U.S. State 
Department declared, “U.S. government assistance to Thailand enhances U.S. 
influence in a strategically important region, strengthens Thailand’s efforts to combat 
terrorism, narcotics trafficking and other international crime, and reinforces military 
cooperation.” 36 FMF programs help to boost the counterterrorism capabilities of 
Thailand’s Special Forces units. Thai IMET graduates hold a majority of senior 
military positions. INCLE activities help Thailand fight corruption in its criminal 
justice system as well as organized crime in the region. NADR assistance supports 
Thai police against terrorist activities in majority-Muslim provinces of the south, 
where a separatist insurgency has claimed the lives of 1,300 Thais since 2004 (Lum 
2007). 
In the Thai English-language daily the Nation Kavi Chongkittavorn recently noted 
that, Congressman Mark Steven Kirk from Illinois, a member of the Subcommittee 
on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment created uproar over the Thai 
political situation. He said the US should not recognise a government that doesn't 
protect US intellectual property censors its national media and increases brutality. He 
urged the Bush administration to strip Thailand of its major non-Nato ally status 
(Kavi 2007b). This stands in sharp contrast to the fact that the military ties between 
Thailand and the US have remained extraordinary strong. Not only does Thailand still 
uphold the status as major non-Nato ally, but also played an important role during the 
first and the second Gulf war. Thai ports and airfields have played a crucial role in 
maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to the wars against Iraq and 
also troops from the Royal Thai army have been active in the wars in the Middle East 
(Chanlett-Avery 2006: 8) and this continues to be the case today. 
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In reality, President George W Bush and senior US envoys in Bangkok see the coup 
as an opportunity to seize the moment and counterbalance Chinese influence. They 
clearly signalled to the junta that Washington has scant intention of downgrading 
bilateral relations. As noted in Asia Times, “Thailand's coup has served US regional 
interests well” (Crispin 2007). Thailand is Washington's most trusted strategic ally in 
Southeast Asia, and US officials are leveraging their senior military contacts now in 
government. While the US maintained ties with Thaksin, particularly through 
cooperation on counter-terrorism issues, there were strong concerns in Washington 
that the ethnically Chinese Thaksin was gradually moving Thailand closer to Beijing 
at the United States' strategic expense (Crispin 2007). Thaksin, a longtime friend of 
the Bush family, resigned from the board of the Bush senior led Carlisle Fund when 
he became Prime Minister (Shorrock 2002) but much to the detriment to Thaksin 
George H. W. Bush senior, paid a personal private visit to His Majesty King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej after the military takeover. This was widely viewed in Thailand 
as a symbolic endorsement of the royalist coup. During last November's Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation meeting in Hanoi, Bush met with Surayud on the sidelines, 
shook hands with him and conveyed that Washington "understood" the necessity of 
the military to get rid of Thaksin. 
Yet another sign of US knowledge of the military takeover was that the Bush II 
administration dismissed Thaksin's personal letter in April 2006 
(http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/07/12/headlines/headlines_30008521.php), 
where he claimed “anti-democratic" forces were attempting to knock him from power 
through “extra-constitutional" means. He didn’t realize those anti-democratic were 
and remain some of the United States' best in-country contacts. It's no surprise when 
a US diplomat confirms that US-Thai military-to-military relations have remained 
firmly “on track" despite the symbolic and very piecemal suspension in aid. 
Accordingly one long-time Thai observer: “The US is saying to itself: they may be 
generals, but they're our generals" (Crispin 2007). 
Whether it is termed real-politik or hypocrisy the US today supports the junta in 
Thailand who ousted a twice democratically elected leader but rejects and even 
boycotts the military regime in Myanmar. It seems that no dictator in Southeast Asia 
that advertises itself as an ally in the ‘war on terror’ need fear that the US will object 
to its seizure of power or exercise of statist prerogatives. But “post-democracy in 
Thailand is, in other words, a process that is part of an ongoing relationship with the 
development of post-democracy in the United States” (Glassman 2007: 2041).While 
publicly lamenting Thailand's retreat from democracy, and more recently criticizing 
protectionist economic policies that threaten certain US business interests, in private 
US officials have persistently reaffirmed to Thailand's ruling generals Washington's 
long-term commitment to keeping bilateral ties on track.  
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For Washington, last year's military takeover has presented a unique opportunity to 
steal a march from China, which through soft diplomatic and economic power has 
seen Beijing consolidate strong alliances which in neighbouring Myanmar, Cambodia 
and Laos but Southeast Asia as a whole (Schmidt 2006). It is therefore no 
coincidence that Thaksin, spurned by what he perceived to be his former US ally has 
chosen to launch his anti-junta propaganda campaign, in attempted divide-and-rule 
fashion, from China and Singapore. 
In conclusion we might say that because Thaksin did not have a good relationship 
with the King he would sooner or later run into trouble especially since he tried to 
replace those loyal to King Bhumipol in the military with his own people. But it was 
the King’s network – their ideology and political sympathies which determined the 
situation and this is where the regional dimension and the US-China link enter. 
 
Concluding remarks 
It is by nature very difficult to actually prove whether the United States gave the 
green light to members of the monarcy network or whether even king Bhumipol 
knew in advance that the US, the EU, Japan and other major powers would not 
establish a boycott regime or implement sanctions similar to the international 
isolation of Myanmar. On the other hand as this paper has attempted to pinpoint there 
is ample evidence showing that it is indeed plausible that the coup makers had 
received a signal from the White House – a whisper in the ear – that enough was 
enough with Thaksin who was responsible for a whole range of attacks on the throne 
and worse he was inclined towards Chinese interests. 
  
Shortly after the coup, Philip Bowring noted in the International Herald Tribune that 
in 1976 and again in 1991, the military has not specifically acted in the name of King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej but his consent is generally assumed. That will be interpreted by 
some as further evidence of his stabilizing influence, saving Thailand from the 
designs of corrupt politicians and ambitious military men. Others, however, will see it 
as evidence of the palace's distaste for democracy and its determination to preserve its 
own influence, rebuilt by the king after a period when it had been sidelined by both 
democrats and dictators (Bowring 2006b). 
 
In conclusion we might say that because Thaksin tried to provoke the King and 
became a major competitor economically, politically and not least symbolically at 
thde ideological level he would sooner or later run into trouble.  
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It is also difficult to give primacy to one explanation and not the other. It seems that 
the reason why king Bhumipol and the monarchy network decided to oust Thaksin 
from the Prime Minister’s office depended on a number of incidents. It also seems 
that the informal institutions were not enough and hence the formal power and 
influence had to be activated. Not only did Thaksiu mishandle the situation in the 
Muslim Southern provinces, and the economy was heading towards shackles, but his 
economic policy was also an outright provocation to the conservative ideology of the 
palace. The question about succession is also important but as this paper has 
suggested the rivalry between US and Chinese influence in the region as such and 
more importantly in Thai politics also became a factor in the decision to stage a 
military coup with the support of the monarchy and probably the White House in 
Washington. 
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